Transnational pharmacogovernance: Emergent patterns in the jazz of pharmaceutical policy convergence by Wiktorowicz, Mary et al.
OCAD University Open Research Repository
Faculty  of  Design
2018  
Transna t ional  
pharm aco gove r n a n c e :  Emerge n t  
patte rn s  in  the  jazz  of  
pharm ac e u t ical  policy  converge nc e
Wiktorowicz,  Mary  and  Moscou,  Kathy  and  Lexchin,  Joel  
Sug g e s t e d  citat io n:  
Wiktorowicz,  Mary  and  Moscou,  Kathy  and  Lexchin,  Joel  (2018)  
Transna tional  pharm acogove rn a n c e :  Emerge n t  pat te rn s  in  the  jazz  of  
pharm ac e u t ica l  policy  converge nc e .  Globaliza tion  and  Health,  14  (1).  ISSN  
1744- 8603  Available  at  http://open r e s e a r c h .oca d u .ca/id/eprin t /3129/
Open  Research  is  a publicly  accessible,  curated  repository  for  the  preservation  and  
disse mination  of  scholarly  and  creative  output  of  the  OCAD  Universi ty  com mu ni t y .  
Material  in  Open  Research  is  open  access  and  made  available  via  the  consen t  of  the  
author  and/or  rights  holder  on  a non- exclusive  basis.  
RESEARCH Open Access
Transnational pharmacogovernance:
emergent patterns in the jazz of
pharmaceutical policy convergence
Mary Wiktorowicz1* , Kathy Moscou1,2,3 and Joel Lexchin1,2,4
Abstract
Background: As a transnational policy network, the International Council for Harmonization of Technical
Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH) aligns international regulatory standards to
address the pressures of globalization on the pharmaceutical industry and increase access to new medicines.
Founding ICH members include regulators and pharmaceutical industry trade associations in the European Union,
the United States and Japan. In this paper we explore the manner in which state interdependence fosters the
conditions for regulatory harmonization by tracing the underlying parallels between ICH and member state
pharmacogovernance to clarify emergent patterns in regulatory policy convergence.
Results: A shift to the life cycle approach to pharmaceutical regulation corresponded with international
convergence in pre-market standards as emphasis shifted to post-market standards where convergence remains
unresolved. Transnational pharmacogovernance was found to concentrate regulatory authority within a co-
regulatory model of bilateral negotiation with pharmaceutical trade associations in defining safety and efficacy
standards. Given a context of state interdependence, parallels were found between transnational and ICH member
pharmacogovernance modes that guide policy development. Divergent modes of state regulatory governance that
re-calibrate perceptions of risk and risk mitigation were found to coincide with post-market policy dissonance.
Conclusion: Although interdependence fostered harmonization in pre-market standards and aligned with
increased focus on post-market approaches, the confluence of divergent state governance modes and perceptions
of risk may inspire improvisation in post-market standards. As the ICH expands to an ensemble with a greater
global reach, further research is needed to clarify the manner in which interdependence shapes transnational
pharmacogovernance and the conditions that foster policy convergence in the public interest.
Keywords: Pharmaceutical regulation, Medicines policy, Transnational governance, Transnational regulation,
Pharmacogovernance, Policy network, Policy convergence, Drug safety, Pharmacovigilance
Background
Policy problems whose resolution is most readily ad-
dressed within a global context present new governance
challenges. Complexities arise as states shaped by
different political, economic and cultural traditions seek
to harmonize regulatory standards [1, 2]. While
globalization and the ascendance of capital markets have
been found to hasten policy convergence, the precise
causal links between the two remain underdeveloped [3].
Although case studies exploring the links between
globalization and policy convergence may cast states as
independent actors with the capacity to assume com-
pletely different policy instruments, the approach ne-
glects their economic interdependence, highlighting the
need for more nuanced analyses exploring the under-
lying strategic political dimension [4, 5]. Interdepend-
ence reflects the mutual dependency of state interests,
where the national policy of one state affects those of
others. Factors that affect interdependence include the
symmetry of states’ economic power and influence, the
type of political strategy that states pursue, and the
degree to which one state depends on others [6].
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Despite the underlying interdependence, state agency
as manifested through domestic institutions that influ-
ence the allocation of authority, remains an important
thread, as policy preferences are often artifacts of their
institutional context [7, 8]. Alternate state governance
orientations and the institutional constraints and oppor-
tunities they present to actors involved in the policy
process affect behavior [9], and have been found to fos-
ter divergent healthcare [10, 11], chemicals [12, 13] and
pharmaceutical policies [1, 14, 15]. As regulatory disson-
ance can create trade barriers for multinational compan-
ies, states share the burden of harmonizing their
regulatory standards to forge a path for international
trade and increase citizens’ access to new medicines.
Even though only one in nine new drugs offer a signifi-
cant therapeutic advance over current medicines [16],
market interdependence nonetheless exerts pressures on
states to pursue harmonization [17, 18]. Medicines regu-
lation is a case rich in insights that shed light on how
transnational networks allocate authority among state
and societal actors in developing global standards that
balance societal risks with the benefits of a competitive
domestic industry [15, 19]. In the pharmaceuticals sec-
tor, a transnational public-private policy network, the
International Council for Harmonization of Technical
Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for
Human Use (ICH) was formed to harmonize inter-
national regulatory standards to address the concerns of
the pharmaceutical industry that different international
regulatory criteria created trade barriers and increased
drug development costs. Streamlined harmonized stan-
dards were further sought to reduce lengthy product re-
views [17]. Originally comprised of the regulators and
industry associations in the European Union (EU), Japan
and the United States (US), the ICH fosters transnational
cooperation in order to align regulatory standards and
reduce trade barriers in response to globalization [20].
Membership was expanded in 2016 to include Canada,
Switzerland, Brazil, South Korea and China, while
Australia and Taiwan are observers; the first step toward
membership.
Understanding how transnational networks’ delegated
authority supplants state agency authority is crucial in a
context in which global regulatory standards are set by
public-private policy networks [21–23]. As regulatory
standard setting shifts from a solely national to a trans-
national concern, where the state no longer holds a
monopoly in the policy process, the manner in which
medicines’ benefits and harms imbued with scientific
uncertainty are addressed through transnational phar-
macogovernance is important to understand. Pharmaco-
governance is defined as the manner in which governing
structures, policy instruments and institutional authority
that enable the development, implementation and
enforcement of regulatory policies are managed to pro-
mote societal interests including protection of public safety
[24]. The objective of this paper is to compare the pharma-
cogovernance framework guiding the ICH to that of six
member jurisdictions (European Union, United Kingdom,
France, United States, Canada and Japan) with established
regulatory frameworks to allow generalizability, yet suffi-
cient range to cover a spectrum of approaches.
Theoretical lens
In network governance theory, governments rely on
transnational networks comprised of policy actors out-
side their hierarchical control to negotiate global norms
and rules of engagement, through which diverse re-
sources are mobilized [25–27]. As transnational net-
works become adept at responding to emerging political
challenges, they contribute to a multinucleated global
system comprised of a series of sectoral networks that
create circuits of power organized around issue areas
[23, 28]. States’ concern for their potential loss of
sovereignty, given transnational networks’ increasing
influence, is countered by the economic benefits of har-
monized, streamlined regulatory processes and common
standards that reduce the necessity to conduct random-
ized controlled trials for different countries, diminish
company costs and shift resources to developing new
medicines. In theory, the lower product development
costs would lead to greater investment in research and
development. States’ interest in expanding market access
combined with a view of regulation as a technical
non-discretionary matter, lends legitimacy to the trans-
national public-private partnership network model [29].
Regulatory networks that involve government and private
sector actors, referred to as public-private policy net-
works, institutionalize cooperative relationships, and cre-
ate a forum where public actors mediate negotiations with
private actors to shape international policy. In private
interest governance, private associations develop public
policies with oversight from public authorities [30].
As globalization advances, the ways in which inter-
national institutions shape and are shaped by domestic
institutional politics becomes more difficult to under-
stand [31]. An interdependence lens that incorporates
historical institutionalism offers a means to assess the
role of the ICH as a global governance network that me-
diates transnational regulatory harmonization [32]. In
this paper, we analyze how ICH member states’ pursuit
of harmonized standards, through transnational cooper-
ation, affects the development of global standards by
comparing the nature, sequencing and unfolding of state,
supranational and transnational pharmacogovernance
processes. In exploring the relationship between inter-
dependence and power, where power is understood as
domestic institutional capacity to articulate a set of rules
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that shape harmonized standards [31], we address the
question of how different institutional configurations
affect the expression of harmonized rules and global
norms that guide regulatory approaches. In exploring
the political context that informs transnational regula-
tory approaches, we consider the question of which ju-
risdictions determine the terms of interdependence, the
coalitions that form and whom they advantage [4].
Guided by the lens of the new interdependence, we trace
parallels between supranational and state governance pro-
cesses to elucidate emergent patterns and the manner in
which the interactions between them may influence
global politics and domestic institutions [31]. State
and supranational pharmacogovernance approaches in
Europe, North America and Japan were analyzed to
clarify the emergent patterns and parallels to trans-
national regulatory governance.
The concept of conversion, in which different state
governance modes can introduce new actors whose goals
may alter an institution’s objectives and lead to policy
discordance, is incorporated in the analysis [33]. We
identify how transnational alliances introduce different
sets of actors that lead to the emergence of new concep-
tual approaches at the transnational level. Where such
approaches may not align with domestic policy, the con-
ceptual discordance between transnational and domestic
actors reflects regulatory layers that can destabilize insti-
tutions and re-shape global politics [33, 34]. After de-
scribing the methods, the sections that follow consider
supranational and state regulatory governance and trace
the parallels between them to clarify the manner in
which interdependence among ICH members predis-
poses them toward policy convergence [35].
Methods
Pharmacogovernance guiding the ICH was compared to
that of six member jurisdictions including the European
Union, United Kingdom, France, United States, Canada
and Japan given their relative similarity as developed na-
tions and regions with established regulatory frameworks
to allow generalizability, yet sufficient range to cover a
spectrum of regulatory approaches [36]. The research in-
volved a review of literature, policy and technical reports
(1990–2017) along with 26 semi-structured interviews with
key informants in international regulatory agencies and re-
lated organizations in 2007, 2010, 2015–2017. Interviewees
were engaged in pharmaceutical regulatory and policy
spheres including the ICH Secretariat, the European
Medicines Agency (EMA), an EMA consumer representa-
tive, US Food and Drug Administration (FDA), US
Veterans Administration Center for Medication Safety, US
Developing Evidence to Inform Decisions about Effective-
ness research network, UK Medicines and Healthcare
products Regulatory Agency (MHRA), UK National
Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE), UK
Drug Safety Research Unit, Haute Authorité de Santé in
France, a regional pharmacovigilance center in France, an
editor of La revue Prescrire the independent French drug
bulletin, and Canadian provincial drug plan representa-
tives. The FDA and Health Canada also offered written re-
sponses to interview questions. Ethics approval was
attained from York University ethics certificate e2015–141.
Interview schema were informed by a review of the lit-
erature, agency administrative and policy documents,
publicly available government documents, newspaper ar-
ticles, and authors knowledge of regulatory policy. The
documents containing discourse pertaining to ICH and
state pharmacogovernance were read iteratively to illu-
minate areas for further exploration. The interview guide
that was developed was modified for different groups of
interviewees based on their role in drug regulation. The
interview guides were continuously updated to probe
additional relevant information that was uncovered dur-
ing preceding key informant interviews. Although the
schema was not pilot tested it was modified based on
initial interviews to clarify the intent of questions.
Content analysis of transcribed interviews was conducted
using Atlas.ti by two authors (KM and MW) who inde-
pendently and collaboratively analyzed and organized the
data into emergent themes through email discussions [37].
Data were coded and analyzed using an analytic framework.
Framework domains were established a priori. A codebook
(Additional file 1) was created with operational definitions
for each framework domain, with illustrative examples, to
guide the independent analysis by the study authors. Infor-
mation from the interviews and document analysis were
cross-referenced to ensure consistency between the two in
order to characterize patterns in international regulatory
governance and policy approaches. When there were areas
of inconsistency we contacted the interviewees to confirm
our interpretation of what they said, conducted additional
interviews and identified additional confirmatory documen-
tation. Key informant quotes that succinctly characterized
an emergent pattern within a theme were included in the
codebook to offer illustrative examples.
To elucidate patterns in state and transnational insti-
tutional governance across jurisdictions over time and
clarify how regulators interact at the global level to
shape transnational governance processes [38], we devel-
oped a framework to compare their regulatory authority,
state-societal relations, representation and the role of
legal channels [29, 39]. A comparative analysis of distinct
state governance modes and approaches to risk manage-
ment enabled us to clarify the conditions that foster im-
provisation in post-market regulatory policy, the
coalitions interdependence supports, who they advan-
tage and how they are leveraged transnationally to foster
policy convergence.
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Results: International approaches to
pharmacogovernance
Transnational network governance - Co-decision-making
As a transnational network, the ICH is a governance
forum whose decisions culminate in a set of harmo-
nized regulatory standards to which its members
agree.1 The ICH began as biennial meetings of regula-
tors and industry associations in the EU, US and Japan
in 1990, who solidified their pursuit of harmonization
in 2003. The ICH secretariat was initially funded by
and housed in the International Federation of Pharma-
ceutical Manufacturers & Associations head office in
Geneva. Governance occurred through the ICH
Steering Committee where each regulator and industry
association was represented by two members, who de-
termined areas for harmonization and set global stan-
dards, such as the Common Technical Document for
new product dossier submissions that reduced dupli-
cate testing.
In the first 25 years, regulators and trade association
representatives co-decided the standards for market
entry of new drugs. Criticism that pharmaceutical in-
dustry representatives chaired committees setting regu-
latory standards prompted the ICH to amend its
governance in 2012, to confine the committee chair to
a regulatory member [40]. As regulators were under in-
creased scrutiny over their interdependence with indus-
try, further ICH governance reforms in 2015 clarified
the leading role of regulators compared to that of in-
dustry and expanded international membership [41].
Prior to the 2015 governance reforms, industry associ-
ation members could propose areas for harmonized
standards. If consensus could not be attained, industry
representatives and regulators, who held equal numbers
of votes, would vote to accept or decline a guideline.
The reforms replaced the Steering Committee with an
Assembly that identifies and approves areas for standards
development and a Management Committee that oversees
operational matters. Regulatory authorities and industry
hold equal seats in the Assembly and Management
Committee where decisions are made through consensus.
In exceptional cases without consensus, votes are taken
and regulators make the final decision. The reforms also
shifted industry funding of the ICH to membership fees.
Co-decision-making in drafting rules also occurs
through Expert Working Groups where standards are
formed and consensus sought [42]. The justification
given for equal representation of industry and regulators
is industry’s technical expertise. Industry is primarily in-
volved in the initial stages in developing a ‘technical
document’ that includes statements of the scientific dis-
cussions in the working group. Once a guideline is
drafted, comment is gathered sequentially from industry
across jurisdictions and then from regulator networks,
with industry members gathering the first set of com-
ments (Fig. 1).2 It is then up to regulators to transform
this technical document with or without changes, into a
guideline for consideration by the Management Com-
mittee and the Assembly. The ICH addresses transpar-
ency by posting its draft guidelines on its website and
allows comments beyond member organizations. A third
party would at the same time need to be aware of the
window for comment. After considering comments,
and the process of consensus and approval in the
Assembly, the guideline becomes a global standard, that
regulatory members commit to implement (Fig. 1, Step
4). A central feature is conversion of the ‘soft power’ of
the ICH to attain consensus on common goals and
technical guides into the ‘hard power’ of state policy
and legislation [43].
Fig. 1 Development of Harmonized Regulatory Standards
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As a transnational pharmacogovernance regime, the
ICH legitimizes pharmaceutical associations’ negotiation
and argumentative persuasion in the development of
standards that guide public policy [42, 44, 45]. The ICH
centralizes the development and transfer of standards,
introducing a concentrated global authority parallel to
the transnational authority of the EMA within the
European Commission [46]. As the ICH is a global
norms initiator, standards are adopted beyond the three
founding jurisdictions including Brazil, Singapore, South
Africa, Mexico and Ghana.
State regulatory pharmacogovernance – Interdependent
and independent decision-making
Interdependence influences network policy decisions to
address the governance of risks that are multijurisdic-
tional, complex and/or ambiguous, such as the risks
posed by pharmaceuticals [47–49]. Although the intent
of the ICH was to harmonize national regulatory stan-
dards, the shift to a life-cycle approach to drug assess-
ment fostered policy convergence among ICH members
in pre-market standards but left unresolved dissonance
in post-market approaches (Table 1) [50]. The life-cycle
approach to regulation acknowledges that some types of
information about a drug are not available prior to mar-
keting (including rare adverse events, interactions with
other drugs, long-term effects and effects on patient
groups excluded from clinical trials), giving regulators a
longer period to gather evidence.
Even in the pre-market phase, state-level implementa-
tion varies reflecting independence in standards for
reporting adverse effects as evidenced by the FDA use of
a different periodic safety update reporting (PSUR)
standard. Companies must adhere to the FDA Guidance
to Industry, or apply for a waiver to use the ICH/EMA
guideline even though the FDA Guidance to Industry is
retired upon publication of the ICH guidance in the
Federal Register [50]. In addition, the ICH and the
Council for International Organizations of Medical Sci-
ences (CIOMS) require pharmaceutical companies to re-
port adverse effects with a possible causal relationship to
a drug. In the US, sponsors must report all adverse
events irrespective of the likelihood of a causal relation-
ship, reflecting American independence.
“An adverse event as we define it does not have to have
a suspicion of causality whereas the ICH standard says
only if suspected [it] is related to a medicine. We think
that casting it broadly like that is the best approach for
seeing things that maybe you might not see otherwise”
(US4-FDA, 2015).
Divergence in these standards creates situations in
which adverse drug event profiles that guide market
authorization decisions, can differ among international
regulators [51]. Despite their interdependence within the
transnational network, states thus retain autonomy to
adapt ICH guidelines [50, 52]. Members’ alternate per-
ceptions of pharmaceutical risks and approaches to ad-
dress them are reflected in discordant state regulatory
standards and responses to safety issues (see Table 1)
[51, 53, 54].3 In Japan for example, clinical trial bridging
studies are required that include Japanese patients [55].
Overall, American and Japanese standards differ most
from those of the ICH and Europe reflecting greater in-
dependent decision making [56, 57]. Even when the
FDA aligns its policies with ICH standards, it does so
with qualifications [50, 51, 58].
State interdependence is alternatively reflected in the
development of a new ICH pharmacovigilance guide-
line that was designed to address uncertainties in
post-market safety, that extended the original ICH
role of harmonization. In response to political pres-
sure from the European Parliament for more effective
post-market surveillance (following the withdrawal of
cerivastatin (Baycol®) in 2001 and rofecoxib (Vioxx®)
in 2004), the EMA sought a new approach. Existing
PSURs capture less than 10 % of adverse drug events,
limiting knowledge about drug benefit to harm ratios.
The European Commissioner for Industry insisted the
EMA enhance pharmacovigilance. Ministers of Health
in the EU also directed their national medicines regulators
to develop pharmacovigilance plans [59]. The EMA and
EU Heads of Regulatory Agencies group formed a com-
mittee to develop a risk management approach that
resembled the UK Medicines Control Agency’s risk man-
agement plan; the two risk management plans (it)
then merged.4 British Medicines Control Agency regula-
tors Waller and Evans emphasized collaboration with aca-
demic clinical pharmacologists and epidemiologists to
advance post-market analytic methods. They advised
multi-center epidemiologic studies focused on serious or
unexpected adverse drug events and introduced the term
‘pharmacovigilance specification’ that refers to a safety
specification and pharmacovigilance plan that guided the
ICH pharmacovigilance plan (E2E) and the EMA’s risk
management plan [60].
The network overseeing the development of the risk
management plan commenced within CIOMS, a World
Health Organization and UNESCO sponsored commit-
tee comprised of regulators and pharmaceutical industry
representatives, that develops regulatory safety standards
including the practice of pharmacovigilance. CIOMS be-
came a pre-ICH consultation forum in which priorities
for harmonization were discussed before their presenta-
tion in the ICH. The concept of the pharmacovigilance
plan was introduced to the ICH Safety Working Group
by two members of CIOMS, a British regulator and an
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industry representative, and became an ICH standard 2
years later [61].
The essence of Waller and Evan’s advice would appear
to have been lost in translation however. In the EMA
standard, the pharmaceutical company develops and
oversees the risk management plan, approved by the
regulator [59]. Pharmacoepidemiologists found the ICH
introduced the risk management plan prematurely, be-
fore it was tested [62]. Giezen et al. [63] found weak-
nesses in risk management plans that affected their
effectiveness. Conflict of interest may arise when
post-market safety studies are designed by the drug
sponsor, who may be reluctant to pursue the rigorous
research needed to establish causality for adverse events
that could jeopardize market share [64–66]. Rather than
focus primarily on the science of risk reduction, risk
management involved balancing inter-related risks such
as the risk to patients should a drug remain on the mar-
ket and risk to the reputation of the regulatory agency
and the pharmaceutical company should a drug be with-
drawn [67]. Without evidence of causality, the sponsor
could justify non-reporting.
“I mean there’s lots of evidence that manufacturer pro-
duced information is biased…but then we rely over-
whelmingly on manufacturers’ information anyway in all
these decisions” (UK5-NICE 2010).
Concern was expressed by European key informants
that the process used to develop risk management plans
Table 1 Convergence in International Medicines Regulatory Standards
ICH EU Canada Japan US
EMA
Britain
France
Pre-2013 Post-2013
Pre-market standards
Rodent
carcinogenicity
tests: for medicines
used for 3 or 6 monthsa
6 months 6 months 6 months 6 months 3 months 6 months
Chronic toxicity
tests in animalsb
6 months 6 months 6 months
(pre-ICH 18 months)
6 months
(pre-ICH 12 months)
12 months 9 monthse
Length of RCTs for
medicines used
for chronic
conditionsa
6 months 6 months 6 months 6 months 12 months Indication-specific
Timing of
toxicity testsc
After initially
taking medicine
After initially
taking medicine
After initially
taking medicine
In accordance with
the drug
characteristics
At steady state Determined by
the clinical
development planf
Expedited
authorization
– Adaptive
pathways
Conditional
approval for
life threatening
conditions
Expedited approval
for regenerative
therapies
(stem cells,
gene therapy)
Fast-track for life
threatening
conditions
Expedited
approval for
serious conditions
Post-market standards
ADR Reportingd If suspect ADR
relates to a
medicine
If suspect ADR
relates to a
medicine
If suspect ADR
relates to a
medicine
If suspect ADR relates
to a medicine
All ADRs
regardless of
suspected
relationship
to a medicine
All ADRs
regardless of
suspected
relationship to
a medicine
Phamacovigilance Risk
Management Plan
Risk
Management Plan
Risk
Management Plan
Risk Management Plan;
Early post-market phase
vigilance; Good
post-market study
practice; Re-approvalg
Risk Evaluation
& Mitigation;
Commissioned
Sentinel data
mining
Risk Evaluation
& Mitigation;
Commissioned
Sentinel data
mining
aAbraham and Reed [46]
bAbraham and Reed [47]
cYu, Bischoff and Tweedie [48]
dCastle and Kelly [49]; Kesselheim et al. [50]
eIn certain cases, non-rodent studies of up to 6 months can be appropriate in Japan and the US [51]. Shorter non-rodent toxicity studies are for
example allowed when immunogenicity or intolerance confounds conduct of longer term studies; in cases of repeated short-term drug exposure even
if clinical trial duration exceeds 6 months; for drugs administered on a chronic basis to reduce the risk of recurrence of cancer; and for drugs for
indications for which life expectancy is short
fFDA written responses to interview questions [51]
gFaden and Milne
Wiktorowicz et al. Globalization and Health  (2018) 14:86 Page 6 of 20
leads regulators to validate a pharmacovigilance strategy
with inherent flaws.
“They don’t actually require manufacturers to go out
and establish what is happening with these drugs, and
what manufacturers imagine is happening with these
drugs I’m sure can be miles away from what patients ex-
perience. And secondly, it is being left to the manufac-
turers themselves to produce and analyze and present
these data. And those seem to be two very fatal flaws. It
doesn’t matter if they work within their limitations, but
what I object to, is a regulatory system which tells the
public how trustworthy and competent they are, on the
one hand, and have such flimsy processes for establishing
benefit/harm ratios” (UK3-NGO 2007).
Academics in the European Society of Pharmacovigi-
lance found that in the ICH’s orchestration of an ap-
proach to pharmacovigilance, scientists were superseded
by conference organizers and drug companies. ICH gov-
ernance excluded the perspectives of academic pharma-
coepidemiologists from decision-making concerning risk
management plans. The drive for consensus tended to
dominate ICH planning rather than in-depth scientific
consideration that could have included a pilot test phase
of the risk management plan to better understand its im-
pact on public health [62]. Rather than expand the range
of possible approaches to assess post-market drug risk,
interdependence would appear to have limited the solu-
tion set given the narrow representation within the ICH.
“A flaw is that we depend on the companies to carry out
the (post-market) studies. We have tried to put in the max-
imum of protection. It would be much better to have a sys-
tem in which academics or HAS carried out the study; the
financing could still come from the industry but this would
permit independence, and alleviate current doubts”
(France3-Haute Authorité de Santé 2007).
The American and Japanese approach to pharmacov-
igilance alternatively reflects independence. In response
to a US Government Accountability Office report [68]
that found the FDA placed a heavy reliance on drug
sponsors to inform it of safety issues, rather than inde-
pendently seeking the information, the FDA Amend-
ments Act (FDAAA) requires the FDA to engage in
active surveillance independent of product sponsors by
contracting independent research centers to investigate
safety signals [69] and increased the FDA’s resources and
authority to do so [67]. While the EMA relies on prod-
uct sponsors to conduct post-market research, the FDA
also independently commissions researchers to mine
electronic healthcare databases and conduct epidemio-
logic analyses to identify drug safety signals independent
of product sponsors.
“Occasionally they’ll say that they thought it was [n’t]
related to anything. Companies think it’s about causality
determination as well. Of course, for things we’re inter-
ested in, we can do our own causality assessment”
(US4-FDA, 2015).
The FDA still requires companies to conduct
post-market studies. While the FDAAA granted the
FDA power to fine companies that do not complete the
post-market studies to which they agree, the FDA has
never used this power [70].5
The FDA’s cooperative agreements with the Centers
for Medicare & Medicaid Services and the Veterans
Administration expand its research expertise and access
to databases. “The FDA needs these questions answered
and we can’t do it ourselves, so we do it in collaboration
with outside groups that have both the data and the ex-
pertise” (US2-FDA, 2010). Active surveillance of health-
care databases is conducted through the Sentinel System
to inform FDA decisions. Although the Sentinel System
has been criticized for not realizing its vision [71], it al-
lows independent assessment of the effectiveness of
FDA safety advisories [72]. Overall, the US approach to
active pharmacovigilance is distinctive in that it does not
rely exclusively on industrial sponsors, revealing its inde-
pendence (Table 1).
“Our regulations don’t contemplate…or require a phar-
macovigilance plan so we think the guideline is a good
guideline it’s just that we don’t have a regulatory mech-
anism for it” (US4-FDA, 2015).
Canada adopted risk management plans in its progres-
sive licensing framework [73]. The principles that Health
Canada enunciated behind progressive licensing are
promising but there is no commitment to balance the
funding or number of personnel devoted to premarket
(75–80%) versus post-market evaluation (20–25%) [74].
In Japan the risk management plan supplements two
additional phased approaches to post-market assess-
ment: re-examination that requires sponsors to collect
post-market data, and a re-evaluation and re-approval
system. The Pharmaceutical Affairs Law (2002) changed
safety and post-market surveillance by instituting Good
Vigilance Practice (GVP) including Early Postmarketing
Phase Vigilance (EPPV) to address the low rate of spon-
taneous reports. Hospitals and physicians complete sur-
veys within 6-months following the launch of new drugs
to closely monitor serious adverse drug reactions in ac-
cordance with EPPV and GVP. A post-marketing survey
is not required when a risk management plan is in place.
A Good Postmarketing Study Practice (GPSP) standard
specifies the studies and surveillance the sponsor must
conduct, which the regulator examines 4, 6 or 10 years
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(depending on product category) after product launch
[75]. The Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices Agency
(PMDA) will also mine healthcare databases to uncover
signals of adverse drug events [76].
In Japan, the regulator’s product safety assessments are
reviewed by an independent advisory body to the Minis-
try of Health, Labour and Welfare, the Pharmaceutical
Affairs and Food Sanitation Council (PAFSC).6 The Min-
ister may request a product be re-evaluated at any time
based on the advice of the PAFSC whose reviews include
adverse drug reaction and GPSP reports. Requiring
re-approval incents sponsors to complete GPSP studies.
When the characteristics of a drug calls for intensive in-
vestigation, the MHLW selects medical institutions to
conduct an early post-marketing phase safety survey [75,
77]. The range of tools Japan uses through GVP and
GPSP form a continuum of pharmacovigilance activities
[56]. The Ministry of Health, Welfare and Labour com-
mittees on “Judgement of Sufferers from ADRs and In-
fections” also inform regulatory policy [75].
Given the emphasis on post-market assessment,
American and Japanese pre-market standards converge,
while post-market standards diverge from the ICH
(Table 1). American and Japanese approaches of inde-
pendent post-market evaluation, that supplement drug
sponsors’ post-market study commitments, reflect policy
dissonance. The next section compares the parallels between
global (ICH), supranational (EU) and national (UK, France,
US, Canada and Japan) modes of regulatory governance).
Tracing parallels between state and transnational modes
of pharmacogovernance
The economic interdependence that globalization fosters
influences the manner in which state and transnational
regulatory network governance evolves [8, 11, 78]
(Table 2). As jurisdictions seek to replicate their domes-
tic rule structures at the global level to alleviate their
need for institutional change, we assess the manner in
which interdependence shapes the transnational network
(ICH), and member states (US, UK, France, Japan and
Canada) and regions (EU) using a comparative analysis
to trace parallels among their approaches to pharmaco-
governance [34].
Regulatory authority
State regulatory governance approaches are guided by dif-
ferent principles of authority that reflect their autonomy
to develop and implement policy. Legislative oversight of
a regulatory agency can lead to frequent hearings, amend-
ments and special investigations, fragmenting authority
[12]. The independent authority of regulatory agencies
tends to be respected in Europe and Canada that endows
their regulators with considerable discretionary power that
tends to centralize agency authority. Public scrutiny is lim-
ited, although not absent as the European ombudsman
criticized the EMA for refusing to release unpublished
clinical trial reports [79]. European and Canadian regula-
tors possess considerable flexibility in their regulatory
judgements and are less likely to be subject to public scru-
tiny by legislative oversight, judicial review or health advo-
cacy groups via freedom of information laws [80].
In the EU, the EMA creates consistent standards for
product authorizations across Member States in the
centralized process. In harmonizing standards, the EMA
balances oversight of pharmaceuticals with a
market-supporting regulatory system. The EMA coordi-
nates Member State regulatory agencies responsible for
market authorization and post-authorization surveillance
through a decentralized process and oversees the scien-
tific assessment of new biotechnology products through
a centralized process. As members of the EMA’s Com-
mittee for Human Medicinal Products that oversee EU
centralized product reviews are seconded from European
state regulators, EU level politicians tend to refrain from
imposing their agenda [81]. In the decentralized process,
sponsors may choose the regulator with the least oner-
ous standards, with the market authorization accepted
in other Member States through mutual recognition.
The European Commission is ultimately responsible for
Table 2 Modes of Pharmacogovernance
ICH EU (UK, France) Canada Japan US
Regulatory
authority
Concentrated Concentrated Concentrated Fragmented Fragmented
State-societal
relations
Negotiation Negotiation Accommodation Negotiation/
Managerial Discretion
Managerial
Discretion
Representation Narrow Narrow Narrow Narrow/ Diverse Diverse
Litigation None Limited Limited Limited Extensive:
Class
Action, Fraud
Decision-making Cybernetic Cybernetic Cybernetic Analytic Analytic
Network
Governance
Interdependent/co-regulatory
decision-making
Interdependent/co-regulatory
decision-making
Interdependent Independent Independent
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the approval and management of medicines market au-
thorizations through the centralized process, whereas
Member States retain responsibility through the decen-
tralized process [82].
In contrast, the FDA’s authority is fragmented. The gov-
ernment’s executive branch sets the terms for agencies
such as the FDA to fulfill their responsibilities, including
agreements with international counterparts [83]. Congres-
sional oversight through a process of legislative hearings
and investigations by special oversight committees con-
strain the FDA’s discretion and authority [68]. In Japan,
regulatory authority is also fragmented through oversight
of its regulator, the PMDA, by the PAFSC which provides
independent advice to the Minister concerning regulatory
standards and the pre- and post-market regulatory reviews
undertaken by the PMDA (Table 2).
As a transnational network, the ICH shapes the global
regulatory agenda; by concentrating network account-
ability to a subset of regulators it reconstitutes global au-
thority for developing regulatory standards to a
public-private partnership that operates beyond the pur-
view of legislative oversight [84].
State-societal relations
Medicines regulators engage in consultations with and
endorse industry self-regulation to varying extents. Consult-
ation occurs through regulatory networks that involve
government and private sector actors, referred to as
public-private policy networks that institutionalize coopera-
tive relationships [30] and create a forum to shape public
policy, where public actors mediate negotiations with
private actors. In the EU, strategies supporting regulatory
governance include ad-hoc consultation bodies and co-re-
gulation involving cooperative public-private partnership
governance arrangements that develop norms and rules
through joint decision-making [30, 84, 85]. Positioned as
experts who guide the formation of regulations, pharma-
ceutical trade associations benefit from a stable regulatory
environment that reinforces the mutual dependence be-
tween the agency and industry [28]. In the UK and France,
pharmaceutical trade associations routinely interact with
government; conflicting objectives are resolved through
continuous political bargaining, a regulatory model based
on a neo-corporatist tradition of negotiation and accommo-
dation with industry through formal relations on a range of
policies [86]. “PPPs [Public Private Partnerships] with
co-regulation activities characterize corporatist arrange-
ments” [7]. Public and private actors are cast as legitimate
partners at the negotiating table allowing industry to influ-
ence aspects of the regulatory process that creates a level of
government-industry interdependence. The modest re-
sources initially assigned to medicines regulators in France
and the UK suggest the model may have been necessary to
gain industry compliance [15].
In France, the regulator was guided by a formal ad-
ministrative framework that operated through informal
regulator-industry cooperation whereby industry
self-assessed its compliance with the regulator’s safety
standards. A decentralized style of industry
self-regulation evolved in which companies hired an ‘ex-
pert’ to assess their compliance with safety standards as
the French regulator was inadequately resourced, lacking
the technical expertise to ensure implementation of reg-
ulations and the ability to act independently. This ap-
proach reinforced the agency’s relationship of mutual
dependence with the industry association [87].
The French Inspection Générale des Affaires Sociale
found institutionalized cooperation with the pharmaceut-
ical industry led to delayed decisions, as reflected in the
regulatory agency’s delay in withdrawing benfluorex (Me-
diator®) from the market. The Inspection Générale des Af-
faires Sociale report led the French Health Ministry to
create a new medicines agency with rules concerning rela-
tionships between drug makers and healthcare experts
[88]. Industry was not engaged in product reviews in the
UK to the extent it was in France, where regulation was
considered passive and largely delegated to the industry
association [89]. At the same time, the British regulator
developed a close working relationship with the Associ-
ation of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI) based
on negotiation and voluntary cooperation to ensure its
members followed regulatory standards [90].7 A UK
House of Commons Health Committee Report (2005)
found the MHRA’s close relationship with industry was
reflected in routine consultation on common policy objec-
tives and agreed processes. The Committee advised a fun-
damental review of the MHRA and recommended
improved post-market surveillance of medicines.8
The neo-corporatist governance approach found in
Europe entails state-industry negotiation, an approach the
European Commission endorses [85]. Although the EMA
supported the establishment of the European Network of
Centres for Pharmacoepidemiology and Pharmacovigilance
(ENCePP), it lacks a legislative mandate or public funding.
Instead, ENCePP was designed to attract drug sponsors’
funding for pharmacovigilance research through ENCePP
research centers [91]. State regulators in the past turned to
the pharmaceutical association when drafting regulatory
policy and referred to their industry counterpart as a part-
ner, that extended to the oversight for post-market studies
for example, where a representative of the EMA indicated,
“We don’t commission studies ourselves… but again,
the [European] Commission is in partnership with the in-
dustry associations…” (EU1-EMA 2007).
A national commission in France recognized the need
for independence from industry when its regulator was
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restructured, and assigned funds for independent phar-
macovigilance research [88].
The Japanese regulator and industry associations were
known to be enmeshed in formal and informal relational
networks that tended “to blur the line between the pri-
vate and the public realm” [92–94]. Health Canada’s cli-
entele pluralist approach incorporated formal avenues
for consultation and negotiation with industry to expand
the range of policy options [95]. In the past, after receiv-
ing early notice of the agency’s thinking on issues, the
industry association presented arguments that may have
been accommodated and was invited to develop draft
policy from which the agency worked [28, 96]. The
agency’s limited resources led it to turn over some of its
authority to private interests, fostering state-societal re-
lations similar to that in Europe [28].
The FDA pluralist approach to policy development al-
ternatively involves indirect involvement of private inter-
ests through judicial appeal [12, 13]. Consultation with
industry takes place at the FDA’s discretion to refine
regulatory systems, whose decision-making is based on
managerial discretion. The social networks that arise
from administrative interactions with product sponsors
can, however, affect regulators’ perspectives and in turn
policies that Carpenter [97] characterizes as corrosive
given their deregulatory effect [98, 99]. Access to free-
dom of information laws and public interest groups’ abil-
ity to sue the FDA for the release of information led to
greater transparency.9 The Federal Advisory Committee
Act of 1972 makes the minutes of FDA advisory com-
mittee meetings publicly accessible.
“…we’ve had some public meetings about that. We’ve
put out concept papers…it not only gives you best
practices but it helps with transparency as well, I
think” (US2-FDA 2010).
The FDA formerly made more information publicly ac-
cessible than other regulators, although not all clinically
significant information was released [100]. The EMA has
become more proactive in this regard and now releases
the clinical study reports that contain almost all the safety
and efficacy data that companies submit to attain market
authorization for a new drug [101]. In Canada, Vanessa’s
Law will enable Health Canada to release the same
amount of information as the EMA once regulations are
finalized. The ability of these agencies to balance a
sponsor’s interest in timely product authorization while
ensuring safety and efficacy standards are met is crucial
[102] given the potential harm from adverse drug ef-
fects [103]. Critics suggest that all regulators’ independ-
ence is undermined by their growing reliance on
industry user fees that create a ‘dual loyalty’ [1, 97, 104,
105] and warn that faster drug approval times with
lower quality evidence have potential serious safety
consequences [106].
Representation in regulatory decision-making
The groups represented in regulatory forums and their
perspectives guide regulatory decision-making. Represen-
tation thus has implications for the network’s ability to de-
velop regulatory approaches that reflect societal values to
enhance their legitimacy [2, 8]. In neo-corporatist govern-
ance models, affected interests are internally represented
within executive decision-making structures. Conversely,
in pluralist models affected interests are externally repre-
sented and given rights to challenge decisions through
“notice and comment” provisions and judicial review,
allowing only indirect influence. In clientele pluralist
models interests operate externally but with the active
consent of the government.
In France, the UK and Japan neo-corporatist represen-
tation in regulatory policy discussions involves govern-
ment and industry associations. The EMA, in contrast,
formally works through six scientific committees, a Pa-
tients’ and Consumers’ Working Party and a Healthcare
Professionals’ Working Party. Although these commit-
tees comment on policies and advise the EMA, in gen-
eral they have not participated in or had access to
decision-making committee minutes [107].10 The sys-
tematic involvement of consumer and healthcare profes-
sional interests in the daily operations of the agency is
thus scarce [82]. The EMA centralized product review
process consists of formal and informal interactions be-
tween two Member State rapporteurs (one nominated
by the product sponsor) who oversee the evaluation and
the industrial sponsor, that are insulated from public pur-
view. The sponsor is assisted in developing its product by
a scientific advice review group, comprised of members of
the CHMP that leads to a preliminary agreement between
the agency and the sponsor concerning the requirements
for a successful application [82, 108]. In coordinating
post-authorization and post-formulary listing decisions,
France’s Comité de liaison had wide representation that
included drug benefit insurers whose goals led the com-
mittee to consider issues of real-world drug use and ef-
fects that prompted active surveillance [109].
In the US, the FDA also interacts with sponsors to
help assure that products will meet the approval process
requirements. Affected interests are otherwise externally
represented in policy development with rights to chal-
lenge decisions through “notice and comment” provi-
sions and judicial review, allowing indirect influence. In
the post-market phase, the FDA engages diverse organi-
zations to inform its decisions to commission pharmaco-
surveillance research through the Federal Partners
Program [97, 104, 105].
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“The Drug Safety Board is essentially an advisory
board to the (FDA) Center Director. And so it includes
a lot of leaders…that are involved in the scientific
review of regulated products…Veterans
Administration, Department of Defense…the Agency
for Healthcare Research and Quality…the National
Institutes of Health” (US2-FDA 2010).
Although FDA advisory committee members that
evaluate the evidence base for product authorizations
must declare conflicts of interest (COI), such
self-disclosure has not necessarily led it to exclude scien-
tists with conflicts from advisory committee votes.
In the Canadian clientele pluralist context, interests
operate externally but with the active consent of govern-
ment. Pharmaceutical trade associations have represen-
tation in Health Canada’s policy network. The Canadian
academic policy community’s advocacy for a publicly
funded center for pharmacosurveillance research made
post-market assessment an area of contested governance.
In response, the federal government launched the
Canadian Drug Safety and Effectiveness Network
through the Canadian Institutes of Health Research that
commissions pharmacosurveillance research from aca-
demic centers. Although Health Canada currently has
limited authority to impose safety studies on manufac-
turers, it has begun to engage DSEN [110].
A history of collaboration between industry and govern-
ment exists in Japan, where the government operates
across public and private sectors. Regulatory policy is
underpinned by a series of “linkages and privileged points
of access and communication between government and
industry, the effect of which is to integrate the industrial
policy community and to facilitate…the formation and
representation of interests” [92]. Despite a history of pol-
icy networks that insulated regulatory policy making from
public debate [92, 94], the oversight and advice of the
PAFSC to the Minister on regulatory standards and prod-
uct reviews has introduced the voice of clinical and social
scientists within the policy process [111] (Fig. 2).
Approaches to COI in regulatory agencies and the
ICH presuppose and promote the idea that COIs cannot
and need not be eliminated as the risk of bias can be
managed. Representation in ICH decision-making is lim-
ited to regulators and industry trade associations, the
latter of which prioritize commercial interests. The ICH
excludes university-based experts (epidemiologists and
pharmacologists), public drug benefit plans, health pro-
fessional associations and consumer representatives
whose experience in assessing drug therapies would lend
insight and counteract industry members’ commercial
bias [97, 112].11 Official statements about COI in laws
and codes of practice in the EMA, MHRA, FDA, the
French National Agency of Medicine and Health
Products Safety (ANSM) and Health Canada suggest
that these regulators have adopted strong policies to deal
with COIs among experts and advisory committee mem-
bers. In practice however, conflicts are managed, leaving
open the very real possibility that COI could either influ-
ence their decision-making or appear to influence it
[113, 114].
Decision-making approach
The processes involved in regulatory decision-making
can be distinguished not only by government-industry
relations that lean to varying degrees toward
neo-corporatist or pluralist approaches; they also vary
in the extent to which they are based on one of two
competing approaches to decision-making: analytic and
cybernetic that use different processes to organize prob-
lems to address uncertainty [115]. The analytic para-
digm involves a comprehensive assessment of available
data [116], while the cybernetic approach focuses on a
limited range of critical variables [117]. The FDA and
Japanese PMDA use a managerial discretion model of
decision-making with an analytic lens; they were the
only agencies that re-analyzed drug sponsors’
pre-market randomized controlled trial data for several
decades. The FDA pools the data for drugs in the same
class to increase the power to detect safety signals lead-
ing to the identification of adverse drug events not pre-
viously reported by industry [118]. A series of product
market withdrawals due to serious or fatal adverse drug
events led Congress to insist the FDA adopt an analytic
approach. Successive congressional investigations of the
FDA and the drug industry criticized FDA decisions
and demanded tougher regulation and oversight by a
competent authority [68].12
“…in…Dec ‘09…the single, the sole recommendation of
the GAO was that the commissioner, the head of the
FDA develop a plan to transfer more of the
responsibility to OSE (Office of Surveillance and
Epidemiology)” (US2-FDA 2010).
Guided by a cybernetic approach to decision-making,
European and Canadian regulators primarily review
summary data, even though there are instances where
the UK MHRA issued regulatory warnings based on its
review of sponsors’ clinical trial data [119]. The EMA
required submission of clinical trial data as of 2011.
Health Canada may request clinical trial data but exer-
cises this authority rarely if at all. Decision-making
within the ICH would appear to follow a cybernetic ap-
proach based on consultation with industry rather than
considering more extensive expertise and perspectives
in harmonizing regulatory standards.
Wiktorowicz et al. Globalization and Health  (2018) 14:86 Page 11 of 20
Implications of litigation for regulation
As legal rulings supersede the authority of a regulatory
agency, understanding the extent to which legal instru-
ments are used to influence regulatory governance and
policy for the ICH and member jurisdictions lends crit-
ical insight. Within member states, the degree to which
litigation may offer a channel for consumers harmed by
unsafe drugs to seek compensation from drug sponsors
varies widely. Legal channels also have implications for
the extent to which regulatory agencies and legislatures
are informed of the burden unsafe drugs pose and may
exert pressure on them for greater accountability. In the
Fig. 2 Global Harmonization Networks and Medicines Regulation
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US, legal suits were found to fragment FDA authority
and drive relative transparency [120] (Table 2). Class ac-
tion and fraud lawsuits against product sponsors have,
for example, hastened change in regulatory processes by
contributing to the evidence available on product risks
[120, 121]. Although the FDA attempted to consolidate
its authority by asserting that its decisions should
pre-empt nearly all legal action concerning drug safety,
the Supreme Court ruled FDA authorization of a drug
label does not pre-empt state law product liability claims
that require drug makers to adequately warn about
product risks [122]. In cases where industry conceals
relevant information and the FDA lacks the capacity to
uncover product harms, the legal system supplements
agency oversight [123]. American class action lawsuits
involving rofecoxib (Vioxx®) for example, led to penalties
of $US5.3 billion for its manufacturer.13
In the UK, France, Japan and Canada, legal suits have
not challenged regulatory decisions to the same extent,
centralizing regulators’ authority. British and French
laws make it difficult to launch class action lawsuits
against pharmaceutical companies. In the UK, a Group
Litigation Order allows multiple cases to be managed ra-
ther than submit a class action claim. A Group Litiga-
tion Order requires all claimants to bring individual
claims that are registered and administered together. Fi-
nancing individual claims in the UK has posed a barrier
to the launch of lawsuits against pharmaceutical compan-
ies [124]. In France, the Hamon law (2014) deemed that
class action suits may only address infringement of com-
petition and must be launched by one of 15 approved na-
tional associations [125]. In Canada, class action lawsuits
occur only occasionally [126]. Japan introduced class ac-
tion legislation in 2016. The American judiciary has thus
had the greatest effect on the regulatory process to date.14
Discussion
Regulation is a distinctive form of policy-making and pub-
lic control where the mechanisms and processes that
guide the formation of regulatory standards meld political,
scientific and technical dimensions [29, 127]. In advancing
harmonization, transnational pharmacogovernance affords
ICH members a means to leverage their interdependence
to reshape international bargains including the potential
to replicate their domestic rule structures through a trans-
national network with extensive global reach [31].
Co-regulatory governance guided the first quarter cen-
tury of the ICH and orients its current decision-making
[7, 45]. The success of the ICH in harmonizing
pre-market regulatory standards fostered its acceptance
by founding members. ICH governance involving bilat-
eral negotiation parallels modes of state-societal rela-
tions and regulatory representation in Canada, France,
the UK and Japan involving regular consultation with
private members who co-develop norms and rules. The
EMA is guided by Article 61 of the European Commis-
sion Regulation 726/2004 that specifies consensus-based
negotiation guided by such soft law instruments as tech-
nical guidelines, parallel to ICH governance [84, 85].
With experience in harmonizing standards across the
EU, the EMA held a “leadership role in promoting inter-
national regulatory cooperation” in the ICH [17]. ICH
co-regulatory governance aligned with the European
Commission [30, 85] and Member States, whose stan-
dards were accepted as ICH guidelines (Table 1).
European and ICH governance trajectories reveal paral-
lels in the timing of transnational harmonization, regula-
tory initiatives (common technical document, risk
management plans) and transparency reforms (Table 3).
In France the inquiry into the AFSSAPS that highlighted
the manner in which COI undermined regulatory deci-
sions through the Mediator scandal hastened a drive for
greater transparency to alleviate the appearance of and ac-
tual COI. In response, the practice of allowing a pharma-
ceutical trade association member to chair an ICH
Working Group developing a regulatory guideline was
curtailed. Parallel reforms shaped longer term governance
and policy in the ICH and European regulators as well. In
the ICH, industry financing was replaced by regulatory
member contributions (the FDA offered $US500, 000 per
year for 5 years from 2016). The US industry member
noted, “The shift in the balance of power from regulated
industry to regulators that the reforms will herald in is ‘ap-
propriate’ and, if anything, the reforms should have been
introduced sooner” [128]. Whether ICH governance re-
forms actually shift power dynamics remains to be seen as
industry networks first comment on a new draft guideline
and may frame it from their perspective, followed by a re-
view by regulators. EMA’s push for transparency involved
enabling the release of RCT data (that was legally con-
tested by industry) and the potential for public hearings
related to pharmacovigilance.
Interdependence between the EU and Japan would ap-
pear to have contributed to regulatory convergence on
risk management plans. Endorsement of industry-led
post-market studies is consistent with a neo-liberal trend
that engenders greater reliance on industry given its
market power [61, 129]; that may lead to perceptions
that safety competes with harmonization [130, 131] as
pharmaco-epidemiologists advise post-market studies be
conducted independently, contrary to the current trend,
to guard against conflict of interest.
Transnational guidelines, developed through negoti-
ation with private sector actors that reduce sponsors’
burden in meeting regulatory standards are framed as
market-based solutions advanced by experts that balance
regulation with industrial competitiveness [15, 23], sup-
port investment in new products and enhance patient
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access [17, 132]. As a parallel transnational regulatory
network that served as a pre-ICH consultation forum for
risk management plans, CIOMS is similarly guided by
the techno-expert model (where pharmaceutical industry
technical experts lend authority). Techno-expert models
attain legitimacy through transparency, public reporting
and accountability, mechanisms that increase the likeli-
hood that policy reflects the values of democratic legisla-
tures. The legitimacy of the techno-expert model may
diminish when regulatory decisions lack public accept-
ance, particularly given the limited channels for incorp-
orating societal perspectives into regulatory decisions
imbued with scientific uncertainty [2, 29].
Despite growing international convergence on supra-
national standards that become de facto global standards
as the ICH and WHO foster their adoption internation-
ally, states retain a level of autonomy [35]. A more inde-
pendent American approach to pharmacovigilance and
different adverse drug event reporting standards coin-
cided with the confluence of more extensive legislative
oversight of the FDA, broader consultation with related
healthcare agencies, and a culture of litigation whose cu-
mulative effects may recalibrate risk perception and
management to foster improvisation in regulatory stan-
dards. An alternate governance process in Japan with
independent oversight of the regulator by the PAFSC led
the Ministry to adopt a more anticipatory approach to
adverse drug events. Inclusion of an independent over-
sight committee for the regulator such as PAFSC, com-
bined with the managerial discretion-guided decision
making within the regulator, was found to counterbal-
ance neo-corporatist relations (Fig. 2).
Conclusion
In a globalized context, transnational networks increas-
ingly replace state governance processes, where trans-
national sectoral autonomy dominates [21, 24, 133]. This
migration of authority from state to supranational net-
works may shift relations of power that prompt questions
of legitimacy [22]. The capacity of transnational pharma-
cogovernance networks to craft policy in the public inter-
est depends on the governance process that guides the
formation of formal decision rules, the incentives of the
actors involved and the types of policy issues addressed.
Networks’ incentives to form policies in the public interest
are highest when governments impose a level of oversight
that prompts accountability [134].
Representation in the transnational network’s govern-
ance framework has implications for its ability to de-
velop standards that reflect societal interests [2].
Table 3 ICH governance trajectory: Parallels to European regulator governance
Year ICH Europe
1987–95 Transnational harmonization
Harmonization of pharmaceutical standards
across EU, US and Japan through ICH
• Consensus-based governance: among regulators
and industry trade associations in EU, US and Japan;
• Funded and housed by IFPMA;
• Industry members may chair standards Working Groups;
• Industry and regulators have equal votes in
determining standards;
• Guidelines on safety, efficacy and quality reflect
EMA standards
Transnational harmonization
Harmonization of standards pioneered in EMA;
EC single market for pharmaceuticals demonstrates feasibility
• Consensus-based governance: among member state regulators;
• EU Centralized and decentralized process for authorizing medicines;
• Centralized concertation process for innovative products, GMP,
labelling, advertising guidelines, rules for blood products and vaccines;
• UK and France: regulators use corporatist governance and negotiation
with industry.
2000–1 Common technical document
• Harmonized product dossier for electronic submissions
Common technical document
• Used in EMA
• EU Clinical trial directive
2004–5 Risk Management Plan
Expands ICH role from harmonization to
development of new standard
Risk Management Plan
UK House of Commons Health Committee criticizes MHRA relationship
with industry and routine policy consultations; advises review of MHRA,
post-market surveillance
2010–12 Conflict of Interest addressed
• Industry members can no longer chair an ICH
Working Group developing an international
standard
Conflict of Interest addressed
• Inquiry into France’s AFSSAPS concerning Mediator (benfluorex)
highlights COI undermined regulatory decisions;
2012–5 Governance reforms:
• Negotiated governance: for decisions with no consensus,
regulators vote;
• ICH is legal entity under Swiss law;
• Assembly; Management Committee;
• Membership fees fund ICH;
• Membership expands jurisdiction
Governance reforms:
• New French regulator (ANSM)
• EMA enables researcher access to clinical trial data
• EMA possibility of public pharmacovigilance hearings
Sources: 50 Years, EU Pharmaceutical Regulation Milestones, European Commission, https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/NewsEvents/UCM500013.pdf, http://
www.ema.europa.eu/ema/index.jsp?curl=pages/about_us/general/general_content_000628.jsp&mid=WC0b01ac058087addd
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Although medicines regulation is considered a technical
non-discretionary matter, the latitude of ICH members
to determine areas for harmonization and the uncer-
tainty inherent in new product reviews [97] suggest
more extensive academic research-based expertise and
representation may enhance policy capacity in the public
interest. A precautionary principle to COI which in
practice means that rather than managing COI it should
be avoided, would improve transnational and national
regulatory processes.
As transnational networks become adept at respond-
ing to emerging political challenges through harmonized
standards that level the international playing field, they
contribute to a multinucleated global system comprised
of a series of sectoral networks, that create circuits of
power organized around issue areas [23]. As inter-
dependence shapes transnational pharmacogovernance,
the parallels found between ICH and member state
governance, including the nature of representation
and decision-making that guides ICH standard setting,
reflect emergent patterns (Tables 1, 2 and 3).
Although such parallels suggest a thread through
which interdependence may shape transnational gov-
ernance, admittedly, the factors that affect the design
of transnational regulatory governance and how they
contribute to regulatory convergence necessitates
further analysis. Areas of policy dissonance that could
be further explored in which the ICH has not been
officially involved include:
1. Accelerated drug authorizations: Although the EMA’s
‘adaptive pathways’ converge with the US and
Canada’s policies for accelerated authorizations, Japan
applies this approach only to regenerative therapies
such as stem cells. Allowing new therapies to enter the
market though accelerated authorizations without
Phase II or III clinical trials reflects regulatory
improvisation that has hastened controversy [106].
2. Dissonance in transparency: Although regulators
have enhanced access to clinical trial data, adverse
event databases and rationales for product refusals
and acceptances, differences among agencies
persist. Even though the FDA enables access to
advisory committee assessment reports, while the
EMA does not make CHMP proceedings available,
the quality of FDA advisory committees has
declined as experts often have COI; the
appropriate experts may be missing or must limit
their comments; and not all drugs are discussed by
an advisory committee. The EMA has been found
to communicate more with sponsors during the
drug review phase than the FDA, such that
sponsors’ applications are at times withdrawn
before being rejected by the EMA [135].
3. EMA-member state regulator decision-making dis-
sonance: The European system of mutual recogni-
tion was designed to facilitate simultaneous
marketing authorization across member states, once
a sponsor attained market authorization from one
regulator. EU member states were initially reluctant
to accept the decisions of other agencies, objecting
to all but one of the 300 applications submitted
from 1975 to 1995 [136], reflecting the complexity
of establishing legitimacy and trust in institutional
relations. As institutional processes and relations
improved, the EMA system of mutual recognition
became the EU system of regulatory approval.
4. EU pharmacosurveillance institutional dissonance:
Issues may arise where one agency depends on
others for information, especially if the work of
different agencies is perceived to be of a different
quality as sometimes occurs. Different levels of
involvement by supranational and national
regulators can also result in unnecessary duplication
of work, that can arise at times when
communication is sub-optimal among the EMA and
member states [137].
In elucidating how similar variables intersect in differ-
ent national contexts, such analyses may better clarify
the conditions that foster policy convergence in the pub-
lic interest.
While globalization and the ascendance of trans-
national networks may cast the state as superfluous,
state capacity to determine the manner in which soft
laws and technical guidelines are articulated offers a
counter balance [35]. Just as an integral element of a jazz
standard is the unresolved texture a dominant seventh
chord introduces before its resolution, transnational pol-
icy dissonance may be integral to a resolution that en-
hances harmonized standards, suggesting a means for
globalization to advance public policy.
Limitations and future research
While we are confident about our insights, we recognize
that there were limitations in our methodology that may
have limited our conclusions about the intersection be-
tween transnational and national/supranational standards
and the multiple possible nuances in the ways that na-
tional or regional decisions interact with harmonization
efforts that we have not addressed, as highlighted above.
Although we gathered perspectives of members of the
pharmaceutical industry from sources in the literature,
they were not included in the interviews and that could
be considered a limitation. Future research could ad-
dress this deficiency by incorporating the perspectives
of, among others, industry, healthcare professionals and
consumers to further explore areas of dissonance.
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Although both documentation and interviews were
used to arrive at our insights there were areas that were
only covered by one type of source and therefore we
could not conclusively determine their completeness
and accuracy. Discerning patterns in transnational and
national governance approaches and the contextual
factors that affect their emergence remains relevant for
future research concerning regulatory convergence.
Endnotes
1The areas where the ICH develops harmonized stan-
dards include: quality guidelines (e.g., conduct of stability
studies), efficacy guidelines (e.g., design, conduct, safety
and reporting of clinical trials), safety guidelines (uncover
potential risks such as cardio-toxicity) and multidisciplin-
ary guidelines (e.g., the ICH medical terminology). See:
http://www.ich.org/products/guidelines.html. Accessed 3
Aug 2018.
2Each member forms a contact network of experts
within their organization from which their representative
is drawn to ensure Expert Working Group discussions
reflect members’ views and policies.
3For example, the US took action on biological prod-
uct safety issues three times more frequently than the
EU from 1995 to 2007 [58].
4Related initiatives of the common committee included
enhanced quality assurance systems, Eudra Vigilance (a
European-wide electronic ADR database), transparent
communications on product safety, coordinated resources
for pharmacoepidemiologic studies and advancing re-
search methods in the field of pharmacovigilance.
5The FDA attained the authority to require manufac-
turers to undertake Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strat-
egies (REMS) and develop Risk MAPs that exclude
active surveillance. REMs and RiskMAPs consist of up-
dated medication guides, healthcare provider education
to support safer use, risk communication strategies, a
prescriber agreement and a patient-physician agreement
[138].
6The PAFSC is comprised of 16 committees and 21
subcommittees. The PAFSC members include experts in
such fields as medicine, pharmacy, biology, dentistry,
nursing and social science based in universities, hospitals
and research institutes; there are 55 permanent members
and about 400 temporary members. Areas addressed by
the PAFSC include the determination of regulatory
standards for drugs, review of new applications,
re-examination and re-evaluation drug applications, and
judgments concerning relief funds payment under the
provisions of the ADR Relief and Research Promotion
Fund Law [80].
7The British Government’s 1987 review of the agency,
prompted by industry’s complaints of slow reviews, was
co-chaired by a former ABPI chair and led to several
changes including industry fees to fund the new product
authorization process. The government also agreed to
consult industry on the agency’s management perform-
ance [94].
8The government ignored most of the Committee’s
recommendations [95].
9The FDA’s relative transparency reflects its adherence
to the Administrative Procedures Act (1946) and the
Freedom of Information Act (1967) that require agencies
to record how decisions have been made, and in the case
of pharmaceuticals to make those records public follow-
ing marketing authorization.
10A pilot project in 2016 involved patients in the
Committee for Human Medicinal Products (CHMP)
benefit-risk evaluation of medicines meetings. Patient
representatives are in some cases funded by pharmaceut-
ical companies [113]. In contrast, consumers are users of
health services overall who may be more objective [114].
11Individuals are not eligible to become members or ob-
servers of the ICH. Articles of Association 17 and 18 allow
the ICH Management Committee to invite organizations
as ad hoc observers to the Assembly, while Article 19
makes provisions for the termination of observer status
[139].
12Although the FDA approach to pharmacovigilance
entails greater independence from industry, the FDA
has not always acted on the safety signals detected. In
the case of rosiglitazone (Avandia®) for example, while
the FDA had internal analyses of an increase in car-
diac events as an adverse drug effect, it did not issue
a safety warning until an independent study was used
to criticize the FDA for not acting on the information
[140].
13Patients harmed by rofecoxib (Vioxx®) filed a
class-action lawsuit against Merck. The company settled
the product-liability lawsuits for $US4.85 billion. Related
litigation, including a multi-district class action lawsuit
against Merck in New Jersey federal court alleged it con-
cealed safety information from company-sponsored trials
from investors. Merck settled the lawsuit by paying
$US830 million to investors who bought Merck stock
[141].
14The EU developed a regulation mandating that
Clinical Study Reports be published following market-
ing authorization and launched a proactive publica-
tion policy (Policy 0070) to upload clinical reports
submitted for marketing authorizations on a publicly
available website in 2014. Despite legal action by com-
panies against the EU to annul the EMA’s decision to re-
lease clinical trial data, the policy stands. The clinical data
are available to download and re-use by academics and for
non-commercial research. Commercially confidential in-
formation may however be redacted before the data are
released [132].
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